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InTroducTIon
The international climate debate currently focuses on the 
world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters: China and the 
United States.1 However, to successfully address the impasse in 
climate change negotiations, the focus should actually be on one 
of the smaller emitters, the Republic of Singapore (“Singapore”). 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”)2 classifies nations into two categories originally 
based on 1990 economic levels: Annex I Parties (developed 
countries) and Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries).3 
Although there is no automatic graduation based on predefined 
criteria, a process and a precedent exists for status graduation 
that could provide a model for countries to shift from Non-
Annex I to Annex I Parties. In 2009, Malta, originally a Non-
Annex I country, successfully petitioned the UNFCCC after 
joining the European Union (“EU”) to “put itself on the same 
legal footing as the other Member States of the European Union 
that are included in Annex I to the Convention.”4 Singapore’s 
economy is also strong enough to shift it from a Non-Annex I 
to an Annex I country and other countries can then follow suit, 
providing a solution to the current impasse in negotiations.
This article offers a “Singapore workaround” as a way for-
ward: diplomatic negotiations with Singapore aimed at changing 
the classification of nations that have developed economically 
since the formation of the UNFCCC. It has been argued by 
“[p]roponents of reclassification . . . that responsibility for mitiga-
tion and eligibility for support should reflect contemporary differ-
ences in levels of development among developing countries, rather 
than those current[ly] built into the Convention.”5 The reclassifica-
tion of Singapore from a Non-Annex I to an Annex I Party would 
provide the ideal model for shifting parties’ obligations in the cli-
mate realm in the future. Singapore is a financial leader in both 
globalization6 and the global recovery7 and is well positioned for 
international and domestic “carbon finance.”8 The nation is eco-
nomically poised to retool its energy sector,9 faces imminent and 
significant risks from climate change impacts,10 and is also ready 
to create and enforce modern climate laws.11 This article examines 
climate law in Germany and Spain to show how Annex I classifi-
cation benefited their economies over the past six years. Finally, it 
discusses how establishing climate laws in Singapore could affect 
emerging economies, namely Brazil, India, and China.
opporTunITy For breakThrouGh In 
InTernaTIonal clImaTe law
Current international climate law is regulated primarily 
by the UNFCCC, which was created in 1992 from the United 
the SinGapoRe woRkaRounD: 
pRoviDinG a “GReenpRint” foR a unfccc paRty ReclaSSification
by P. Cal Trepagnier*
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, also commonly known as the “Earth Summit.”12 
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 binds Annex I Parties to 
reduce “their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per-
cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period between 2008 
and 2012.”13 Under the Kyoto Protocol, however, the majority 
of countries—Non-Annex I nations—do not have greenhouse 
gas reduction targets.14 Moreover, there is no automatic system 
that requires them to reduce emissions, regardless of the level 
of gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita.15 The lack of a 
mechanism to graduate Non-Annex I Parties once they achieve a 
certain level of economic development has emerged as perhaps 
the greatest challenge of the UNFCCC.
The richer developing nations with high emissions that do not 
take on Annex I rights and responsibilities have long caused frus-
tration and concern for the United States,16 which refuses to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol and commit to emissions reductions.17 The 
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is on course to end 
in 2012 and recent UNFCCC negotiations in Cancun, Mexico fell 
short of creating a second commitment period.18 A lack of emis-
sions reductions targets from emerging economies such as Brazil, 
India, and China have caused stalemates in international negotia-
tions.19 Despite Singapore’s small size and its relatively minor 
greenhouse gas emissions, Singapore’s graduation to an Annex I 
Party could have broader implications for emerging economies in 
the international effort to curb global climate change.
A graduation mechanism in the UNFCCC would adjust 
country mitigation obligations over time. A similar option was 
successfully established by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; that Protocol created a 
panel that reviews country requests for exemptions from ozone 
depleting substance commitments.20 Currently however, the 
UNFCCC’s approach to evaluating country classification is 
ambiguous.21 Singapore taking on the rights and responsibili-
ties of an Annex I Party would help to kick-start the process 
and encourage other rising nations to follow suit. Therefore, the 
United Nations should facilitate talks with Singapore regarding 
the transition of Singapore’s status from a Non-Annex I country 
to an Annex I country.
* P. Cal Trepagnier is a master’s student at The Johns Hopkins University in the 
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economIc readIness
The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) describes Singa-
pore as a “newly industrialized Asian economy.”22 Singapore, 
by land area, is a small, densely populated urban city-state that 
has limited energy resources.23 In contrast to its Southeast Asian 
neighbors, Singapore is not a major agricultural center and there-
fore much of its food is obtained through importation.24 The 
IMF last reported on Singapore’s GDP in 2009 and, at reces-
sion levels, Singapore had a GDP of $182.2 billion U.S. dollars 
or $37,200 U.S. dollars per capita.25 Singapore’s economy has 
proven to be one of the most stable—not just in Asia, but also 
globally.26
As a result of a strong economic outlook, Singapore can con-
tinue to retool its energy sector and meet the challenges of carbon 
reduction.27 Singapore has already taken significant action toward 
clean energy development. In 2001, for example, Singapore’s 
National Environment Agency set up the Innovation for Envi-
ronmental Sustainability Fund to provide grants for clean energy 
investment.28 In 2007, the Economic Development Board created 
the inter-agency Clean Energy Programme Office (“CEPO”).29 
Additionally, the Ministry of National Development allocated 
approximately thirty-nine million U.S. dollars over a five-year 
period for a Research Fund for the Built Environment.30
Currently, Singapore also receives carbon finance through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), under which 
Annex I Parties sponsor projects in Singapore to offset the spon-
soring country’s emissions.31 The Kyoto Protocol defines the 
CDM as an instrument “to assist Parties not included in Annex 
I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to 
the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and to assist Parties 
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quan-
tified emission limitation and reduction commitments under 
Article 3.”32 If Singapore were to accept Annex I responsi-
bilities, it could no longer receive CDM financing and would 
instead finance these projects in the developing world to help 
offset its own emissions.33 With its regional placement and cul-
tural expertise, Singapore would be well positioned to sponsor 
the projects for other Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”)—nine other developing countries that do not tra-
ditionally participate in climate finance projects.34 Furthermore, 
Singapore’s stable and strong financial sector would bring addi-
tional liquidity to the global carbon market.
sInGapore’s clImaTe neGoTIaTInG posITIon
The Singaporean government has taken a proactive stance 
on mitigating global climate change and enforces its laws effec-
tively. Singaporean climate negotiators made statements dur-
ing the last two Conferences of Parties (“COP”) meetings that 
indicate its willingness to address global climate change.35 On 
January 28, 2010, Singaporean Ambassador-at-Large and Chief 
Negotiator for Climate Change, Chew Tai Soo, wrote, “Singa-
pore therefore wishes to associate with the [Copenhagen] Accord 
as a good basis for advancing further international negotiations 
towards reaching a legally binding global agreement on climate 
change” in a letter to the Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, of 
the UNFCCC Secretariat.36 On December 9, 2010, Shunmugam 
Jayakumar, Singapore’s Senior Minister and Chairman of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change addressed a 
high level conference in Cancun, Mexico at the 16th COP meet-
ing.37 He emphasized his commitment to a legal framework stat-
ing that 
it is important that as we pursue a “Balanced Package” 
in Cancun, we must have clarity that our end goal is to 
reach a legally binding outcome. Whatever we achieve 
in Cancun, and whatever be our next steps, it is impera-
tive that these elements or decisions will eventually be 
stitched together in a legally binding nature, without 
which, there can be no guarantee of mitigation actions, 
nor can there be guarantee of the support provided.38
Moreover, as a requirement for being a member of the 
UNFCCC, Singapore submitted two “national communications 
on climate change.”39 Each communication shows a willingness 
to offer solutions to mitigate and adapt to climate change.40 In its 
first national communication to the UNFCCC in August 2000, 
the government of Singapore wrote, “[c]omprehensive preven-
tive measures to safeguard the environment will not work unless 
there is stringent enforcement to ensure that the laws and regula-
tions are complied with.”41 In its second national communica-
tion from November 2010, the Singaporean government stated,
As a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC, we are not 
subject to binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Our contribu-
tion to global greenhouse gas emissions is, and will 
remain, small. Nonetheless, as a small-island state vul-
nerable to the impacts of global climate change, Singa-
pore takes climate change seriously. We will therefore 
continue to do our part in global efforts to address cli-
mate change.42
However, some opposition exists within the Singaporean 
government. Its chief climate negotiator, Chew Tai Soo, made 
a statement in February 2009 that Singapore should not become 
an Annex I Party given its size and relatively small carbon 
footprint: 0.3% of global emissions.43 Mr. Chew also made an 
unofficial statement at a sustainability conference in Singapore 
regarding his opinion on the UNFCCC country classifications: 
“This approach is flawed as it does not take into account the 
unique considerations and capabilities of different countries . . . 
it penalizes small countries with small populations without tak-
ing into account their limitations.”44
These comments do not reflect Singapore’s overall commit-
ment in addressing climate change and the important example 
it would set for the global community by becoming an Annex I 
party. For example, in 2009 a program called Sustainable Singa-
pore Blueprint pledged that the nation would reduce greenhouse 
gases by sixteen percent below 2020 business as usual levels 
if a binding international agreement on climate change were 
reached.45 With this program, Singapore is already implement-
ing a voluntary mitigation plan, as a contingency should there be 
a binding international climate agreement. The United Nations 
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should facilitate discussions to encourage Singapore to “gradu-
ate” and accept these responsibilities since Singapore is willing 
and able to create and enforce laws necessary to achieve carbon 
reductions.
annex I success and ImplIcaTIons  
For emerGInG economIes
Singapore can benefit from looking to two Annex I Parties, 
Germany and Spain, as models for maintaining economic growth 
through Kyoto Protocol-based energy efficiency and renewable 
energy projects. In 2005, both Germany and Spain entered into a 
binding agreement to reduce carbon emissions under the Kyoto 
Protocol.46 Since then, laws designed to reduce carbon and mod-
ernize electricity generation, distribution, and consumption have 
steadily increased.47 Germany has a national commitment to 
reduce its carbon footprint forty percent from its 1990 levels by 
2020.48 Germany met its 2012 goal early, in 2007, by generat-
ing 12.5% of its electricity from renewables, and Germany will 
likely exceed its twenty percent by 2020 goal as early as 2011.49 
By 2020, conservative estimates show that Germany will source 
forty-seven percent of its electricity from renewable energy.50 
Thus, while honoring its Kyoto Protocol commitments, German 
energy projects have in turn bolstered the fifth largest economy 
in the world.51 Spain made a commitment to reduce its carbon 
emissions by twenty percent from its 1990 levels by 2020, in line 
with the EU target.52 Spain also committed to achieving twenty 
percent of its own final consumption and ten percent of its trans-
port energy needs from renewable energy by 2020.53 According 
to its 2005-2010 Renewable Energy Plan, Spain plans to deploy 
clean energy to meet 12.1% of its primary energy needs, 30.3% 
of electricity needs, and 5.83% of transportation fuel.54 One of 
Spain’s goals in its 2004-2012 Energy Efficiency Strategy is to 
reduce domestic energy intensity by 7.2% by 2012.55
If Singapore adopts Annex I status and follows in Ger-
many and Spain’s carbon reduction footsteps, it could advance 
compliance in other developing countries such as Brazil, India, 
and China. These countries will face greater and different chal-
lenges in greenhouse gas reduction from Singapore due to their 
larger size and strong economies.56 However, Singapore could 
establish the model and blueprint, which would help to change 
the playing field for non-Annex I Parties and encourage greater 
participation among those nations. Binding carbon emission 
reductions and carbon finance are only possible if countries take 
responsibility for their contributions to climate change, however 
small they are.
conclusIon
In the UNFCCC, richer nations, mostly those in the EU, 
have assumed the role of Annex I Parties.57 Singapore can and 
should become an Annex I nation so that it can fulfill a broader 
role on the global stage as a leader in greenhouse gas reduction. 
Singapore is the ideal candidate for graduating from Non-Annex 
I to Annex I. Its mature economy is ready to retool its electric-
ity sector and to finance clean development mechanism projects. 
Singapore has national interests in safeguarding its borders from 
flooding and protecting the health of its citizens.58 It has a stable 
government with a history of developing innovative laws and 
enforcing them.59 As the international climate law community 
awaits 17th COP in Durban, South Africa, it should consider 
graduating a nation to Annex I status as a way to shift bind-
ing obligations from the Kyoto Protocol to a new international 
agreement between nations.
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